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INHERITING THE WIND: THE SUPREME COURT AND
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN THE 1990s
FRANKLIN

E.

ZIMRING*

T

HIS paper attempts to set a context for a discussion of the U.S.
Supreme Court and capital punishment in the 1990s. I hope to
survey a number of the political and legal developments of the 1980s
that will have a significant impact on the character of the Court's involvement with capital punishment in the future. The plan of this Article is to march from the general to the specific, addressing in this
order: 1) the status of capital punishment in the community of nations
in the early 1990s; 2) recent U.S. trends in death sentences, death row
populations, and executions; and 3) the institutional pressures associated with the Court's prominent role in capital cases and the execution
process.
The justification for this broad survey is my belief that all of the
aspects listed above are important parts of the environment of capital
punishment that both define the Court's work and determine the influence of this Court's pronouncements on American society and
criminal justice. My conclusion after peeking at the multiple layers of
influence on the Court is that the tensions and conflicts about the
death penalty are not likely to abate in the United States or the Supreme Court during the 1990s. Because of the Court's doctrinal statements during the past decade, the stalemate pattern of high death
sentence rates but very few executions outside traditional high execution states is unlikely to continue during the 1990s. Instead, there may
be an increase in executions in the coming decade that would be a
significant break with the first fifteen years after Gregg v. Georgia.'
But the increase in executions will not reduce the conflict about the
death penalty in the country or the Court. The roots of the conflict
about executions in the United States are deeper than the federal court
pronouncements that the Supreme Court has sought to reverse. Pressure toward a broader execution policy in the United States will generate both resistance and ambivalence. The courts are likely to remain a
* William G. Simon Professor of Law and Director, Earl Warren Legal Institute, University of California at Berkeley. B.A., 1963, Wayne State University; J.D., 1967, University of
Chicago. I thank Albert Alschuler, Richard Frase, and Michael Laurence for comments on a
previous draft.
1. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
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focal point for public unease. Having sown the seeds for either large
increases in executions or some other institutional actors taking responsibility for avoiding executions, the U.S. Supreme Court is unlikely to achieve the distance from executions and death penalty policy
that has been its primary institutional ambition for more than a decade.
I.

INTERNATIONAL TRENDS

My survey of the 1990s will start with the good news: The trend
toward abolition of capital punishment continued during the 1980s
and gained both force and generality toward the end of that decade.
The end of the death penalty was achieved by the early 1980s in the
European Economic Community countries and abolition also was accomplished in most of the major nations of the British Commonwealth.2 Efforts to restore capital punishment in the United Kingdom
and Canada were decisively defeated.' No western nation reintroduced
the death penalty in the decade.4 By the count of Amnesty International, during the 1980s eighteen nations abolished capital punishment
for all crimes and four abolished capital punishment for ordinary
crimes only.' Of the twenty-two abolitions, sixteen occurred in the second half of the decade. 6
The upheavals in Eastern Europe and South Africa have been followed by strong pressure away from the death penalty. Formal abolition of the death penalty has occurred in Romania, Hungary, and
Czechoslovakia. 7 The former German Democratic Republic, which
had abolished its death penalty in 1987, merged into an abolitionist
union.' Political movements toward abolition are found almost everywhere in the former Communist sphere when democratic reforms take
hold, including the Soviet Union before its breakup. 9 In South Africa,
2. Amnesty International, The Death Penally:List of Abolitionist and Retentionist Countries, ACT 50/01/92, Feb. 1992 (Table 1).
3. The United Kingdom House of Commons defeated, by a vote of 362-245, a motion to
make terrorism a capital offense. See Jon Nordheimer, Commons Defeats a Move to Bring Back
Hanging, N.Y. TIMEs, July 14, 1983, at A6. The Canadian Parliament defeated, by a vote of
148-127, a motion to restore capital punishment. See Canada'sParliamentRejects Move to Restore Executions, N.Y. TimEs, July 1, 1987, at A7.
4. Amnesty International, supra note 2 (Tbl. 1).
5. Amnesty International, supra note 2 (Tbls. 1 & 2).
6. Amnesty International, supra note 2 (Tbls. I & 2).
7. Amnesty International, supra note 2 (Tbl. 1).
8. Amnesty International, supra note 2 (Tbl. 1, note **).
9. The Soviet government reported to a United Nations survey that executions were "a
temporary and exceptional measure ... temporarily applied pending [their] complete abolition"
in 1987. See Roger Hood, The Death Penalty in InternationalPerspective, (Amnesty International), Dec. 11, 1991, at 5.
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which averaged well over 100 executions a year in the late 1970s and
early 1980s, executions were suspended in 1990 and a law reform
process that could point toward abolition has begun. 0
The move toward abolition in many Eastern European countries
has been abrupt, without much evidence of the incremental and gradual steps many western nations have experienced. The short time between the collapse of predecessor regimes and abolition suggests that
rejection of the death penalty is part of the discrediting of the preceding regimes more than a modeling of the new government on particular western models. In Romania, shooting the previous dictator and
then abolishing the death penalty seem two ways of rejecting his regime in much the same way that Germany and Italy moved away from
capital punishment shortly after the second world war while the major
Allied powers retained the death penalty for decades thereafter."1
The enthusiasm for abolition in Eastern Europe seems a demonstration that the movement away from executions is seen principally as a
limit on government power. The association between nonexecution
policy and government respect for human rights on other fronts
is not, of course, fortuitous. Both nonexecution and human rights
policy are derived from the same conception of the proper
relationship between citizen and government in the political and
social order. That conception involves a negative constraint on
government
regarding its use of individuals as a means to political
2
ends.'
It is precisely that "negative constraint on government" that makes
the end of executions an early agenda item for democratization in
Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. The Eastern European developments since 1989 provide a time-series demonstration of the link between abolition and other human rights to confirm the cross-sectional
evidence that had been used to support the theory in earlier scholarship.
As Eastern Europe was joining Western Europe in policies of nonexecution, execution as an instrument of state power has become almost exclusively a Third World phenomenon practiced with

10. See ]an H. van Rooyen, Toward a New Post-Apartheid South Africa: With or Without
the Death Sentence? 20 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 1993).
11. Amnesty International, supra note 2 (Tbl. 1), dating abolition by the Federal Republic
of Germany in 1949 and by Italy in 1947 (for ordinary crimes); France did not abolish until
1981. The two-step English process took place in 1965 and 1970. FRANKLIN ZnOING AND GORDON HAWKINS, CAPITAL PUNISHIMENT AND THE AMERICAN AGENDA 12 (1986) (English data).
12. ZIMRING AND HAWKINS, supra note 11, at 23.

10
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enthusiasm only in Moslem states, in China, and parts of Africa." In
the industrial West, only the United States has executions. This isolation of the United States among its peers is more pronounced in the
1990s than ever before.
II.

THE UNITED STATES IN THE

1980s

To classify the United States as a nation with capital punishment in
the 1980s would be inaccurate and misleading. The United States federal government has not conducted an execution since 1963 and in all
likelihood will not have one until the twenty-first century.' 4 The fifty
state governments are divided into three categories, with about onefourth of the states having no death penalty, another fourth maintaining a death penalty on the statute books and conducting at least one
execution during the decade, and half having a capital punishment
statute on the books but conducting no executions since the 1960s. 11
Throughout the 1980s, the United States was a place where death
sentences were not uncommon in a majority of states but only thirteen
states executed anyone. 6 The resulting buildup of death row populations through the decade is shown in Figure 1, which compares executions in the United States by year with the January 1 death row
population for that year and the number of death sentences.
The visually striking element of this graphic is of substantive importance: It is difficult to fit execution trends and death row populations
on the same chart. Figure 1 shows new death sentences averaging
above 250 per year throughout the 1980s while the execution total increased from one in 1981 to twenty-one in 1984, then stabilized at
about twenty per year for the second half of the decade. The result is
that death row populations expanded inexorably from fewer than 600
at the beginning of 1980 to 2,250 by December 1989.

13.

Amnesty International, supra note 2 (Tbl. 4).

14.

Franklin Zimring, Drug Death Penalty: A Federal Tantrum, N.Y. TnrEs, Sept. 16,

1988, at A35.
15. Franklin Zimring, Ambivalence in State Capital Punishment Policy: An Empirical
Sounding, 18 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 729, 730(1990).

16.

Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, Nevada, North

Carolina, South Carolina, Texas, Utah, and Virginia. Id. at 733 n.7.
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Figure 1. Executions, New Death Sentences, and Death Row
Populationin the United States in the 1980s
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(NAACP Def. & Legal Educ. Fund, New York, N.Y.), Apr. 24, 1991;

Source, New Death Sentences:

BUREAU OF JUST. STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF

JUST., CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 1990.

Three aspects of the trend comparison between executions and
death row populations are noteworthy. First, the number of executions in the United States rose quickly in the early 1980s but leveled
off for the rest of the decade. Because the death row population kept
growing, the rate of execution measured against the total population
at risk fell during the late 1980s from its 1984 peak of just under two
percent. The average number of executions during 1984-86 was nineteen, compared with the eighteen per year average during 1987-89. But
this seemingly flat total comprised 1.2% of the average year-end death
row population in the earlier years and only 0.806 of the year-end average in the later years.' 7
Second, the huge growth in death row populations that took place
in the 1980s was not a product of an upward trend in death sentences.
There was about a three percent expansion in death sentences, from
245 in 1981 to 251 in 1989, but each year's rate of death sentences was

17.

The year-end death row average for 1984-86 was 1,586 and for 1987-89 was 2,119.

DEATH Row U.S.A. (NAACP Def. & Legal Educ. Fund, New York, N.Y.), Apr. 24, 1991.
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more than ten times its rate of executions. Unless major changes in
sentencing, execution, or commutation policies come on line, the
death row population could exceed 5,000 in the next decade.
The third notable fact about trends in death row populations and
executions is that the volume of executions has not responded in any
obvious way to variations in death row population during the 1980s.
If and when the rate of execution responds to fluctuations in the population at risk, execution numbers will constantly increase until the
number of executions and other removals from death row equals or
exceeds the rate of new death sentences, currently slightly fewer than
300 per year.
Very few states actively participated in the execution business during the 1980s, creating one major restraint on executions during that
time. Only a third of the jurisdictions with death penalties executed
anyone during the decade, and the concentration of executions among
a very few Southern states persisted throughout the decade. Between
1977 and 1985, thirty-six of fifty executions, or seventy-two percent of
the total, took place in four states: Texas, Florida, Georgia, and
Louisiana. 8 From 1986 through the end of 1989, fifty of the seventy
executions that occurred, just over seventy percent, were in the same
four states. 9 When four jurisdictions out of fifty execute three times
as many persons as all other jurisdictions combined, executions cannot yet be considered a national policy. This hyperconcentration
would also appear to be an unstable situation.
One of the most remarkable elements of the death penalty history
of the late 1980s was the drop in new states conducting executions.
From 1981 through 1985, nine states conducted their first execution.2
By contrast, from 1985 through 1990, only two of the twenty-five
states with death penalties but no prior executions joined the execu2
tion roster. '
One other significant feature of the capital punishment policies of
the 1980s was the extent to which the states that began to execute in
that decade were a self-selected sample of jurisdictions with long histories of high levels of executions. Of the thirteen states that started
executions before 1990, 22 ten were also among the twelve states with

18.

Id. at 175-77.

19.

Id. at 177-78.

20.

ZIMIN

21.
22.

Zimring, supra note 15, at 732 (Tbl. 1).
Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, Nevada, North

AND HAWKINS, supra note 11, at 129 (Tbl. 7-1).

Carolina, South Carolina, Texas, Utah, and Virginia. Zimring, supra note 15, at 734 (Tbl. 2).
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the highest per capita rate of executions in the 1950s, 21 the last decade
during which state execution behavior was substantially free of federal
court control. The odds against this kind of recent selection occurring
by chance are less than one in 22,000.24 Thus, those states that were
historically strongly inclined toward execution were most likely to
have carried out an execution during the decade despite the intervention of federal courts. This suggests that local climate in the twentythree death penalty states that did not execute in the 1980s contributed
in some important way to this result." While the primary restraint on
execution in the United States during the 1980s was the federal court
system, the pattern of executions also suggests that complete restraint
occurred most often in those jurisdictions with some historic ambivalence about capital punishment.
Nonexecution in twenty-three of thirty-six capital punishment states
during the 1980s occurred because of a complex interaction between
federal law and procedures and local conditions. The national government was also surely a restraint in the most execution-prone states.
Texas, for example, had the largest number of executions in the
United States during the decade, but its 1990 death row was, nonethe26
less, ten times the number of its executions during the 1980s.
A variety of processes not well understood leveled off the growth in
execution and the spread of execution to new states from the mid1980s on. As can be seen in the next section, however, the rulings of
the U.S. Supreme Court during this period were not directed at restraining executions.
III. THE

SUPREME COURT IN THE

1980s

Most of the opinions issued by the U.S. Supreme Court in death
penalty cases during the 1980s fit surprisingly well into a global summary statement: Most of the justices have been trying to make the
Court a less important institution in the regulation of capital punishment and to make capital cases a less conspicuous and less important
part of the Court's workload.
The effort to disengage the Court from capital punishment work
has raised issues of both substance and procedure and has involved
23. Alabama. Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, Nevada, South Carolina, Texas,
Utah, and Virginia. Zimring, supra note 15, at 738 (Tbl. 3).
24.

Zimring, supra note 15, at 736-37.

25.

Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Idaho, Illinois, Ken-

tucky, Maryland, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, Ohio, Okla-

homa, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Tennessee, Washington. and Wyoming. Zimring,
supra note IS, at 734.
26. Zinring, supra note 15, at 731 (Fig. 2).
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Chief Justice Rehnquist and former Justice Powell in extrajudicial
lobbying to reduce the press of capital punishment cases on the Court.
As early as 1983, an analysis of the Court's work was appropriately
titled DeregulatingDeath,27 and both the force behind this campaign
and the divisiveness of these cases for the justices increased after middecade. Many of the holdings in the 1980s illustrate the irregularities
the Court was willing to tolerate in the name of federalism. These irregularities included execution of the retarded 28 and upholding death
sentences despite statistical evidence of racial disproportion in death
sentences. 9 But the most noteworthy departure from usual Court decorum-and the clearest window into the majority's motivationscame in the sustained attack on habeas corpus as a mechanism to keep
capital cases continually before the federal courts and ultimately the
Supreme Court. Strong pressure was exerted to reduce the occasions
on which substantive constitutional challenges could be heard by federal courts in capital cases in the report of the Powell Commission in
1989,30 in Chief Justice Rehnquist's lobbying, 3 and finally in the
Court's decision in McCleskey v. Zant.3
The problems with repetitive raising of issues already litigated in
state or federal courts have been variously described as abuse of the
writ, excessive delay in execution as a frustration of justice, or the
subversion of the system by manipulative lawyers. 33 At one level, the
debate about habeas corpus can be seen as a power struggle between
capital defendants and the justices for control of federal court dockets. In this sense, it is the potential of multiple habeas procedures to
take agenda-setting power out of the hands of the Supreme Court
Justices that particularly bothers the opponents of multiple habeas. In
fact, defendants do not have the power by themselves to set a compulsory agenda for the U.S. Supreme Court. But sympathetic hearings
given to condemned prisoners by federal district courts can be a
chronic problem for a Supreme Court that wishes to downplay the
place of death cases in its workload.
If too many death cases are viewed as the overriding problem, an
obvious solution would be a set of substantive principles and jurisdic-

27.
28.

Robert Weisberg, Deregulating Death, 1983 Sup. CT. REV. 305.
Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989).

29. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
30. Ad Hoc Committee on Federal Habeas Corpus in Capital Cases, Report on Habeas
Corpus in Capital Cases, 45 CRIM. L. REP. (BNA) 3239 (1989) [hereinafter Powell Commission].
31.

See, e.g., Text of Chief Justice William Rehnquist's remarks to ABA, reprinted in CHI.

DAILY L. BULL.,

32.
33.

Feb. 14, 1989, at 2.

111 S. Ct. 1454 (1991).
See, e.g., Text of Chief Justice William Rehnquist's remarks, supra note 31.
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tional limits that restrict the discretion of lower federal courts. If
norms of nonintervention can be imposed on the federal courts, nonintervention can become the neutral principle that obliges the Supreme
Court to avoid efforts to restrain executions. Once such norms have
the force of law, perhaps the public will see that the Supreme Court
Justices cannot intervene: Their hands are tied. This will, of course,
require short memories about the fact that the justices, after lobbying
for outside restriction for years, finally fashioned the nonintervention
knot themselves.
Why this appetite to avoid decisionmaking responsibilities in death
cases? I do not think that enthusiasm for executions can explain the
Court majority mustered in McCleskey. Some justices may have a
substantive pro-capital punishment bias, but Justice White, for example, voted with the majority in McCleskey 4 after providing the fifth
vote against death in Furman v. Georgia.3 Nor would I classify
Justice O'Connor's performance in death cases as bloodthirsty. And
Justice Powell, in the Powell Commission report, seemed more concerned with the political vulnerability of federal courts than by a pau36
city of executions.
A key to the broad support for jurisdictional limits on capital cases
is not direct concern about federalism but the self-protective intention
to insulate the federal courts from the hostility and damage that active
involvement in capital cases has generated. In this view, the federal
courts' role as the visible mechanism for stopping executions in the
United States for twenty-five years has contributed to public hostility
toward courts in general and the federal courts in particular.
The wish behind restructuring capital case jurisdiction is that less
intense involvement of the federal courts would ease the pressure on
the deliberate processes of the Supreme Court and diminish the extent
to which the Court is blamed for the delays and frustrations that accompany capital cases. The larger the perceptual distance between executions and the Court, the better for the Court's internal workings
and public relations.
While the wish to distance the Court from the execution process is
only a subtext in McCleskey, there is a more palpable aspect of this
desire in the Chief Justice's statements and the justification for procedural change put forward by the Powell Commission. Chief Justice
Rehnquist, in his 1989 midyear State of the Judiciary address to the
American Bar Association, said:

34.
35.

481 U.S. 279(1987).
408 U.S. 238 (1972).

36.

See Powell Commission, supra note 30.
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In the case of Ted Bundy, the so-called "serial killer" executed in
Florida last month, the Supreme Court of the United States received
three separate applications for a stay on the day before the date
scheduled for execution.
All three of these actions were being prosecuted in these courts
simultaneously on the day before the execution of a prisoner who
had been on death row for nine years. Surely it would be a bold
person to say that this system could not be improved.37
The Powell Commission underscored this concern by isolating
"last-minute litigation" as a substantial separate concern involved in
capital cases. Its report stated that "[i]n most cases, successive petitions are meritless, and we believe many are filed at the eleventh hour
seeking nothing more than delay." 3 The system the Commission
wishes to put in place is one where "[tihe merits of capital cases
should be reviewed carefully and deliberately, and not under time
pressure. This should be true both during state and federal collateral
review. But once this review has occurred, absent extraordinarycircumstances there should be no further last-minute litigation."19
Why is this "last-minute litigation" a problem for the Powell Commission? As long as lawyers for the condemned are a conspicuous
presence just prior to execution, there is an intimate link in the public
mind (and in the perception of many Court personnel) between the
Court and the execution process. This intimate linkage creates a nowin public relations dilemma. If executions are halted, the Court is
frustrating the operation of other governmental activities. If executions proceed, blood is on the hands of the justices. And so the solution desired by the Powell Commission is some mechanism that would
eliminate the dilemma of "last-minute litigation."
As a matter of literal fact, it is difficult to imagine how the incentive for last-minute litigation could be totally removed from a system
of capital punishment in which condemned prisoners are represented
by counsel because last-minute appeals are frequently the only ray of
hope available at that point in time. Yet this is the clear wish reflected
by the Powell Commission, as well as in the Chief Justice's specific
indictment of eleventh-hour appeals,4 and in the majority opinion of
41
McCleskey v. Zant.

37.

See, e.g., Text of Chief Justice William Rehnquist's remarks, supra note 31, at 5.

38.
39.

Powell Commission, supra note 30, at 3240.
Powell Commission, supra note 30, at 3240 (emphasis added).

40.
41.

See. e.g., Text of Chief Justice William Rehnquist's remarks, supra note 31.
111 S. Ct. 1454 (1991).
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The disengagement with capital punishment that many on the Supreme Court now seek is a return to the conditions that existed in the
United States before 1960. Before the large-scale intervention of federal courts, the important controls over execution policy were at the
state level. 42 That is where a condemned offender's last hope of clemency or postponement resided. The popular culture remembers accurately when the movies of the 1930s through the 1950s began the
execution scene with the announcement that the governor had turned
down a petition for clemency. In that version of American government, it could be said that the micro-management of the number of
executions in the United States and their timing was not the business
of the United States Supreme Court. One corollary to this perception
was that the executions that did occur were rarely regarded as the
moral responsibility of Supreme Court justices.
IV.

THE PROSPECT FOR DISENGAGEMENT

Will the Supreme Court work itself free of the perceived responsibility for execution policy in the United States during the 1990s? My
doubts that this goal can be achieved in this decade (or later) grow
from the substantial problems associated with reversing historical
processes. Moreover, I expect that events in the 1990s will conspire
against the Supreme Court's quiet withdrawal from the business of
regulating executions.
The first major obstacle to disengagement is the general difficulty
of undoing history. The current American clich6 on the subject is that
it is difficult to get the toothpaste back into the tube. For three decades, federal courts have been intimately involved in the regulation of
capital punishment, and this has changed both public perceptions and
the expectations of a number of important constituencies including
lawyers, governors, and federal judges. Executive clemency all but
disappeared in the United States in the era of hands-on federal court
involvement. 4 Extensive involvement in individual death penalty cases
has come to be expected of and by federal courts. This new tradition
has rendered cutbacks in federal habeas corpus a contentious issue,
even in a Congress anxious to append more than fifty new death penalties to the federal criminal code." So there is a substantial amount
of toothpaste to squeeze back into the tube before the recent history
of federal court involvement in capital cases can be nullified.

42.
43.

See Zi ,INo AND HAWKINS, supra note 11, ch. S.
See ZIMRING AND HAWKINS, supra note 1, ch. 5, at 101.

44. See Clifford Krauss, After Senate Backs Bush and Blocks Anti-Crime Bill, Congress
Goes Home, N.Y. TwEs, Nov. 28, 1991, at D22.
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Furthermore, conditions in the 1990s will be anything but favorable
for such an outcome. The best case for successful federal court disengagement would be a combination of low levels of public involvement
and high levels of judicial agreement with a nonintervention policy.
But neither public apathy nor judicial solidarity appears on the horizon. Executions are still important news stories even in the few states
that execute with some frequency. And a pending execution in a
northern industrial state is a sure prescription for a media circus, creating conditions that exacerbate public ambivalence about capital
punishment and focus attention on the institutions that hold power in
the execution process. Increasing numbers of executions in states without strong capital punishment traditions can only increase the salience
of the death penalty as a public issue in the 1990s. This is not a favorable environment for an institution of government that has been the
most important actor in capital cases for twenty-five years to tiptoe
off stage. Increasing public attention to executions in the United
States is thus a barrier to disengagement of the courts.
So too is the absence of consensus in the federal judiciary in support of nonengagement policies. If almost all federal judges agreed
with a hands-off policy, the absence of debate within the judicial
branch would provide some apparent legitimacy to disengagement.
Notwithstanding the almost complete conservative restaffing of the
United States Supreme Court and the large number of conservative
appointments to federal district and appellate courts, the potential for
judicial disagreement on disengagement policy is substantial. The potential for disagreement on deregulating death begins at the top, with
the United States Supreme Court.4 During the 1980s, even as Reagan
appointments to the Court accumulated and the appointees behaved
in predictable fashion, the division of the Court in capital cases by
most conventional measures increased. Notwithstanding the dissents
of Justices Brennan and Marshall, the majorities that disposed of capital cases in the first half of the eighties were usually substantial.4 In
the latter part of the 1980s, however, the majority of all death cases
were decided by five-to-four votes. 47 So a potential for division on the
Supreme Court cannot be ignored even in an era of conservative hegemony.
In the federal district and circuit courts, an extraordinary potential
for resistance to federal court disengagement can be found in the hun45. See, e.g., Robert A. Burt, Disorder in the Court: The Death Penalty and the Constitution, 85 MICH. L. REv. 1741 (1987).
46. Franklin E. Zimring and Michael Laurence, CapitalPunishment, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE
Am. CoNST. (Leonard W. Levy ed., Supp. I 1992).
47. Id.
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dreds of life-tenure judges who have participated in more extensive
death case review and who are not happy at the prospect of allowing
large numbers of executions. Indeed, federal district and circuit court
judges were the most important restraint on the number of executions
during the seven years after 1984 when the uptrend in executions was
effectively halted.
An impression of disarray is necessarily communicated when life
and death issues are decided by five-to-four majorities, and when
whole judicial circuits split down the middle on death penalty cases. 48
The potential for division is significant even if a majority of circuits
supports hands-off results because far more than a majority of the
United States Supreme Court will be necessary to create conditions in
which the public no longer views the Court as responsible for executions. As long as federal courts engage in extensive tugs of war in
individual cases and as long as the role of the federal courts is actively
debated within the judiciary, the high profile of the federal courts,
and specifically of the U.S. Supreme Court, in capital cases will be an
unavoidable fact of American political life. It will thus take extraordinary changes both in constitutional law and the composition of the
federal courts before capital cases become anything but a chronic ailment for the federal judiciary.

48.

See Dan Morain, Harris Case Splits Appeals Court, L.A. Trmis, Dec. 4, 1991, at A3.

